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BERGHUIS V. SMITH:
CONTINUING AMBIGUITY
IN FAIR-CROSS-SECTION CLAIMS
Natalie A. Pifer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to a jury trial is among the nation’s most cherished
privileges.1 The jury ensures the accuracy of American conceptions
of representative democracy2 and the right to a fair trial.3 With these
lofty protections in mind, the U.S. Supreme Court has given
particular attention to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
and has accordingly mandated that a jury be drawn from “a fair cross
section of the community.”4 By ensuring that the jury is truly
representative of the community and “not the organ of any special
group or class,” the fair-cross-section requirement is essential to
protecting the justice system’s integrity.5
To detect violations of the fair-cross-section requirement, the
Court has developed a three-pronged test.6 As established in Duren v.
Missouri,7 a defendant must show the following: (1) that the
allegedly excluded group is a “distinctive” group in the community;
(2) that the representation of this group in jury venires is “not fair
and reasonable” in relation to the group’s number in the community;
* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. 2008, New York University, College
of Arts and Science. A special thanks to Professor Samuel H. Pillsbury for his invaluable
supervision and advice. Also, thanks to the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review for their superb editorial support.
1. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 867–70 (1994).
2. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (describing the jury trial as the
primary vehicle for protecting citizens from their government).
3. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
4. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975).
5. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85–86 (1942).
6. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
7. 439 U.S. 357.
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and (3) that the “underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process.”8 However, defining the
specific contours of the Duren test has proved elusive.
In its most recent fair-cross-section case, Berghuis v. Smith,9 the
Court grappled primarily with Duren’s final two prongs.10 Perhaps
most strikingly, the Court flatly refused to adopt a single appropriate
mathematical method for measuring underrepresentation,11 despite
urging to do so from the state of Michigan12 and confusion among
lower courts.13 Rather than confront this statistical disarray in any
meaningful manner, the Court instead rested its decision on Duren’s
third prong—despite the defendant’s failure to prove
underrepresentation as required by Duren’s second prong.14 The
Court’s willingness to consider evidence of systematic exclusion
without any conclusive evidence of underrepresentation marks a
departure from the sequential and intertwined application of the
Duren test’s prongs.
This Comment explores the Court’s missteps in Berghuis v.
Smith. Part II introduces the relevant facts and traces the case’s
procedural posture through both state and federal courts. Part III
discusses the Court’s reasoning in rejecting the defendant’s habeas
corpus plea. Part IV argues that the Court’s refusal to adopt any
single measure of underrepresentation is unfortunate and that its
choice to rest its decision on Duren’s third prong is an unusual
departure from fair-cross-section jurisprudence. Part V concludes
that together these outcomes make the ability to protect a defendant’s
right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community unnecessarily ambiguous and vulnerable.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 364.
130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010).
Id. at 1388.
Id. at 1393–94.
Reply Brief at 13, Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (No. 08-1402).
Brief of Respondent at 26–30, Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (No. 08-1402).
Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 1394–96.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts: Kent County’s Jury-Selection Procedure
In 1991, Christopher Rumbley was shot and killed during a
brawl at a crowded Michigan bar.15 Soon after, the state charged
Diapolis Smith with Rumbley’s death.16 In preparation for Smith’s
trial in Kent County, Michigan, the state initiated its jury-selection
process.17 In order to fill the courts’ venires18 at the time of Smith’s
trial,19 Kent County first mailed questionnaires to prospective
jurors.20 The county granted hardship exemptions to some members
of the pool of prospective jurors who returned the forms.21 After
granting hardship exemptions, the county assigned the remaining
prospective jurors to the venires of local district courts charged with
trying misdemeanors.22 Then, after filling the district court venire, the
county assigned the remaining prospective jurors to the circuit court
responsible for trying felony cases—such as Smith’s murder trial.23
This procedure resulted in a venire panel of some sixty to one
hundred potential jurors for Smith’s trial, only three of whom were
African American.24 Despite Smith’s objection to the venire panel’s
racial composition,25 his case proceeded to trial in front of an allwhite jury, and he was convicted.26
B. Michigan State Court Rulings
Following his conviction, Smith appealed to the Michigan Court
of Appeals, alleging that the composition of his trial jury did not

15. Id. at 1389.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. A venire is “a panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among whom the jurors
are to be chosen.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1590 (8th ed. 2004).
19. One month after voir dire for Smith’s trial, the county reversed the order in which it
assigned jurors. Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 1389.
20. Id.
21. Id. For example, hardship exemptions were granted for lack of transportation or
childcare. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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represent a fair cross section of the community, thereby violating the
Sixth Amendment.27 During the evidentiary hearing ordered by the
court of appeals, Smith provided statistical evidence challenging the
validity of Kent County’s juror-assignment procedure.28 Smith’s
statistics expert testified that during the month in which Smith’s jury
was selected, the comparative disparity29 of African Americans was
34.8 percent.30 Smith argued that the Kent County’s juror-selection
procedure had systematically resulted in this underrepresentation.31
First, Smith provided evidence explaining this statistical
underrepresentation of African Americans as the result of social and
economic factors further exacerbated by Kent County’s jurorselection process.32 These factors made African Americans less likely
than whites to receive or return the county’s prospective-juror
questionnaires and more likely than whites to request hardship
exemptions.33 Second, Smith argued that the refusal of Kent County
police to enforce orders for prospective jurors to appear and Kent
County’s practice of granting hardship-exemption requests without
adequate proof also reduced the representation of African Americans
on jury venires.34 Finally, Smith argued that Kent County’s
siphoning-juror-assignment procedure—entirely filling district court
venires before circuit court venires—resulted in an unacceptable
underrepresentation of African Americans on circuit court venires.35
Ruling in Smith’s favor, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that
the county’s juror-assignment procedure resulted in the systematic
underrepresentation of African Americans.36
The state then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. Before
turning to Smith’s evidence, the court discussed the different
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Here, comparative disparity was determined by dividing the absolute disparity by
African Americans’ representation in the jury-eligible population. The absolute disparity was
“determined by subtracting the percentage of African-Americans in the jury pool . . . from the
percentage of African-Americans in the local, jury-eligible population.” Id. at 1390.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1388–89.
35. Id. at 1388.
36. Id. at 1390; Brief of Respondent, supra note 13, at 11.
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statistical methods employed to determine underrepresentation.37
While concluding that each method presented its own set of strengths
and weaknesses, the court declined to adopt any measure as the
prevailing test.38 Rather, the court held that courts should—so long as
parties provide sufficient evidence—consider the results of all
statistical measures in determining whether representation was fair
and reasonable.39 In evaluating Smith’s statistical evidence, the court
found that Smith had failed to show a legally significant disparity.40
Even assuming that Smith had shown unfair and unreasonable
underrepresentation, the court found that Smith had not shown
systematic exclusion of African Americans.41
C. Smith’s Habeas Corpus Petition in Federal Court
In the face of the Michigan Supreme Court’s denial of his faircross-section claim, Smith filed a habeas corpus petition in federal
district court, reasserting his fair-cross-section claim.42 The district
court dismissed Smith’s petition,43 finding that the Michigan
Supreme Court’s ruling did not involve a contrary or unreasonable
application of federal law.44 Smith then appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.45
There, Smith’s fair-cross-section claim found traction. The court
of appeals reversed, ruling that when the allegedly excluded group is
37. Specifically, the court discussed the absolute disparity test, the comparative disparity
test, and the standard deviation test. People v. Smith, 615 N.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Mich. 2000), rev’d sub
nom. Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010).
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. There, the court evaluated both comparative and absolute disparity. Id.
41. First, the court noted that Smith did not show how the alleged siphoning of African
American jurors to district court venires affected the circuit court juror pool. Second, Smith’s
statistical evidence did not show “whether the district court jury pools contained more, fewer, or
approximately the same percentage of minority jurors as the circuit court jury pool.” Finally, the
court held that Smith’s evidence of social and economic influences on the pool of prospective
jurors did not establish a systematic exclusion of African American jurors. Id. at 3–4.
42. Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1391 (2010).
43. Id.
44. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006), a federal court may only grant a habeas corpus
petition on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment if it finds that state
court decision: (1) was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of law of clearly
established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court; or (2) was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding.
45. Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 1391.
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small—as was Kent County’s African American population—courts
should measure underrepresentation using only the comparative
disparity test.46 Applying that measure, the Sixth Circuit found that
Smith’s statistical evidence was sufficient to demonstrate an unfair
and unreasonable representation of African Americans in Kent
County’s venire pool.47 As to Duren’s third prong, the Sixth Circuit
found that Kent County’s juror-assignment procedure significantly
reduced the number of prospective African American jurors available
for Kent County circuit court venires.48 Since Smith had established
Duren’s three prongs, the Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan
Supreme Court’s rejection of Smith’s appeal constituted an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as
established by the Supreme Court in Duren.49
The state petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. First, the
state claimed that the Sixth Circuit’s decision to adopt the
comparative disparity test as the exclusive measure to determine if a
small but distinctive group was underrepresented in the jury pool was
erroneous.50 Second, the state argued that, regardless of the statistical
measure used to determine if African Americans were
underrepresented in Kent County’s venires, there was no systematic
exclusion of African Americans.51
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING:
A FLAT REJECTION OF ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit, holding that Smith had failed to make out the prima facie
case necessary to successfully assert his fair-cross-section claim.52
Citing its landmark ruling in Duren, the Court focused its analysis on
the Duren test’s final two prongs.53 The most challenging elements of
the Duren analysis, these prongs determine whether the allegedly
“distinctive” group is unfairly and unreasonably represented in the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 338 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 345.
Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 1392.
Id.
Id. at 1395–96.
Id. at 1388.
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jury venire and, if so, whether “systematic exclusion” in the jury
selection caused that underrepresentation.54
First, in response to the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of the
comparative disparity test, the Court noted that neither Duren nor
any other precedent mandates a test that courts must use in
measuring a distinctive group’s representation in jury pools.55 Noting
that no single method is perfect,56 the Court declined to endorse any
particular test as the appropriate method to determine a group’s
representation.57 Rather than focusing on whether Smith had satisfied
Duren’s second prong, the Court dedicated a substantial portion of
its analysis to whether Smith had satisfied Duren’s third prong:
whether the alleged underrepresentation of African Americans in
Kent County’s jury pool resulted from “systematic exclusion.”58
The Court’s analysis here was twofold. First, the Court rejected
Smith’s statistical evidence, finding that the evidence did not
substantiate his claim that Kent County’s juror-assignment procedure
resulted in the systematic exclusion of African Americans from
circuit court venires.59 After citing several types of evidence that
Smith could have produced, the Court evaluated Smith’s “best
evidence” of systematic exclusion—that the comparative
underrepresentation of African American in circuit courts declined
from 18 percent to 15.1 percent after Kent County reversed its jurorassignment procedure.60 Noting that even Smith’s counsel recognized
the change as trivial, the Court agreed with the Michigan Supreme
Court’s finding that this evidence failed to establish that Kent
County’s district-court-first assignment procedure caused any
significant underrepresentation of African Americans.61
Second, the Court evaluated Smith’s claim that to prove
systematic exclusion under Duren a defendant need only show that
the “underrepresentation is persistent and ‘produced by the method

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 1393.
Id.
Id. at 1393–94.
Id. at 1394.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1394–95.
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or “system” used to select [jurors],’ rather than by chance.”62 As
evidence of “‘systematic’ causes,” Smith pointed not only to Kent
County’s district-court-first assignment procedure but also to a
“laundry list” of additional factors.63 In response, the Court rejected
Smith’s argument that he could satisfy Duren’s prima facie case
requirement “merely by pointing to a host of factors that,
individually or in combination, might contribute to a group’s
underrepresentation.”64 The Court instead stated that Duren requires
the defendant to carry the burden of proving that systematic
exclusion had caused the alleged underrepresentation.65 In addition,
the Court noted that its precedents have never established that the
jury-selection procedures included in Smith’s “laundry list” can give
rise to a fair-cross-section claim.66 Rather, the Court noted that its
past holdings have granted the states broad discretion to create their
jury-selection procedures and that, in particular, hardship exemptions
may very well “survive a fair-cross-section challenge.”67
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION
While Berghuis v. Smith contributes very little clarity to faircross-section precedent, the decision is notable for its missteps. First,
this part argues that the Court’s failure to confront the confused
jurisprudence
surrounding
the
appropriate
measure
of
underrepresentation necessary to satisfy Duren’s second prong is
particularly unfortunate for small populations of distinctive groups.
Second, this part contends that the Court’s willingness to evaluate
Smith’s evidence of systematic exclusion—even after finding that
Smith had failed to show underrepresentation—is a strange and
potentially irresponsible departure from fair-cross-section
jurisprudence.
62. Id. at 1395.
63. Id. This list included Kent County’s
practice of excusing people who merely alleged hardship or simply failed to show up
for jury service, its reliance on mail notices, its failure to follow up on nonresponses,
its use of residential addresses at least 15 months old, and the refusal of Kent County
police to enforce court orders for the appearance of prospective jurors.
Id.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Spring 2011]

BERGHUIS V. SMITH

1043

A. The Numbers Game in Fair-Cross-Section Claims
Rather than select a single methodology to determine fair and
reasonable representation,68 the Smith Court demurred, merely noting
that each statistical test is “imperfect.”69 Given the muddled
jurisprudence surrounding Duren’s measure of underrepresentation
jurisprudence and the second prong’s importance, the Court’s silence
here is particularly frustrating.
Under the Duren test, a defendant cannot successfully
demonstrate a prima facie case alleging a violation of the fair-crosssection requirement unless the defendant can show that the
distinctive group was underrepresented on the venire panel as
compared to its representation in the community.70 The test’s
language, however, is unclear regarding the proper method of
measuring underrepresentation to meet Duren’s requirement.71 In the
face of this ambiguity, lower courts must grapple with a bevy of
statistical measures to calculate whether the degree of
underrepresentation is substantial enough to meet Duren’s
requirement.72
While four different mathematical measures have emerged as
dominant means of calculation,73 courts have failed to apply them
consistently.74 Additionally, even courts that have elected to rely
heavily on one particular measure in deciding underrepresentation
have recognized their chosen approach to be problematic.75 For
example, although the Fifth Circuit professed a preference for one
method,76 the court in its next breath advised against “an intractable
use” of that measure, fearing that such an allegiance might produce
“distorted results.”77
68. Id. at 1394 n.4.
69. Id. at 1393.
70. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
71. Peter A. Detre, Note, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the Composition
of the Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1917 (1994).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1918 (describing absolute disparity, absolute impact, comparative disparity, and
statistical decision theories as the four major mathematical measures used to determine
underrepresentation for Duren’s purposes).
74. Id.
75. Brief of Respondent, supra note 13, at 27 n.10.
76. Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 834 (1975) (“[T]he preferable view is that an absolute
measure should be employed . . . .”).
77. Id. at 835.
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While the inconsistent and unclear application of various
statistical measures has resulted in a confused body of fair-crosssection case law and unpredictable outcomes,78 the Supreme Court
had offered little guidance regarding the standards for measuring the
underrepresentation required to establish a Duren violation.79 Against
this backdrop of ambiguity, Smith presented the Court an opportunity
to provide clarity. Perhaps in recognition of this possibility, a focus
on the proper measure of underrepresentation necessary to satisfy
Duren was evident in both the briefs and at the oral argument.80 In
particular, the justices’ eagerness to elicit the state’s preferences
regarding
the
appropriate
measure
of
determining
underrepresentation foreshadowed that the Court’s ruling would
finally clarify the ambiguity surrounding Duren’s second prong.81
However, since the Court was unwilling to indicate a preference
for any one method of determining underrepresentation or to provide
any guidance in distinguishing methods,82 a prudent defendant is left
to use all available tests in arguing Duren’s second prong.83 The
Court’s silence enables courts to pick and choose among the varied
statistical outcomes when determining if a distinctive group is
underrepresented, maintaining an element of unnerving
unpredictability84 inherent to the judicial discretion85 in fair-crosssection claims. The Court’s blanket refusal to clarify the appropriate
standards surrounding underrepresentation represents a missed
opportunity to add clarity to—and to eliminate the unnecessary
confusion surrounding—Duren’s second prong.

78. Detre, supra note 71, at 1918.
79. Richard Seltzer et al., Fair Cross-Section Challenges in Maryland: An Analysis and
Proposal, 25 U. BALT. L. REV. 127, 134 (1996).
80. See James Bickford, Court Rejects Sixth Amendment Habeas Challenge to the
Representation of African Americans in the Jury Pool, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 1, 2010, 2:21 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=18197.
81. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010) (No.
08-140).
82. Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 1393.
83. This strategy would follow the Michigan Supreme Court’s direction that courts should
consider the results of all statistical measures for which parties provide evidence. People v.
Smith, 615 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 325 (6th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010).
84. See Detre, supra note 71, at 1918.
85. See Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 835 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the decision to
measure underrepresentation using an absolute or comparative measure should be “flexible”).
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This failure resonates as particularly disappointing given that
Smith implicated a distinctive group of relatively small size as
compared to Kent County’s overall population.86 Under the currently
muddled approach to determining underrepresentation, small
populations of distinctive groups are left particularly vulnerable
under Duren’s second prong.87 As the Sixth Circuit explained, it is
unlikely that using an absolute measure88 to determine whether a
small minority population is underrepresented will ever find a
constitutionally significant level of underrepresentation.89 In contrast,
the use of comparative disparity to determine a small distinctive
group’s measure of underrepresentation is much more
“meaningful.”90 However, given the Court’s failure to adopt
comparative disparity—or even highlight the particular
vulnerabilities of small distinctive groups under an absolute
measure91—courts have retained the discretion to entirely exclude
such groups by manipulating statistical measures.
B. A New Order of Fair-Cross-Section Claims?
Further, the Court’s willingness to consider evidence of
systematic exclusion even after finding that Smith had failed to show
underrepresentation is a curious departure from fair-cross-section
jurisprudence. Rather than reach Duren’s third prong, the Court
could have easily found that the Michigan Supreme Court’s denial of
Smith’s fair-cross-section claim was reasonable92 simply because
86. Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 337 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010).
87. See Detre, supra note 71, at 1921 (explaining that when analyzing the distinctive group
in a small percentage of the population, the use of absolute disparity or absolute impact may
produce distorted results regarding that group’s underrepresentation).
88. Absolute disparity measures the difference between the percentage of a particular group
in the general population and the percentage of that group in the pool of prospective jurors on a
venire. Absolute impact is the product of the absolute disparity and the total number of persons in
the pool of prospective jurors on a venire. It evaluates the effect of underrepresentation in terms
of the reduction in the number of a particular group in the pool of prospective jurors on a venire
from the number that would be expected absent underrepresentation. See United States v. Yazzie,
660 F.2d 422, 426 n.3 (10th Cir. 1981).
89. See Smith, 543 F.3d at 338 (“Indeed, even if African Americans in Kent County were
never called for jury service, the absolute disparity would still fall below the 10 percent figure
that courts have found to be a threshold indicator of a constitutionally significant disparity.”).
90. Id.
91. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 1393.
92. As is the standard when reviewing state court decisions under a habeas corpus petition.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
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Smith had failed to satisfy Duren’s second prong by establishing
underrepresentation.93 Instead, the Court reviewed Smith’s evidence
of systematic exclusion, ultimately finding that Smith had failed
there as well.
The Court ruled that a defendant cannot show systematic
exclusion “merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually
or in combination, might contribute to a group’s
underrepresentation.”94 Perhaps more interesting, however, the Court
temporarily assumed Smith had met Duren’s second prong in order
to reach its systematic-exclusion analysis. This approach is illogical
when considered in light of the Duren test’s analytical ordering.
The language of Duren’s prongs implies a sequential order since
the successful establishment of each preceding prong is necessary
before the defendant can attempt to establish the next. Thus, a
defendant cannot attempt to prove a group is underrepresented
without first proving that the group is distinctive. Similarly, and
more central to the Court’s analysis in Smith, a defendant cannot
attempt to demonstrate that a jury-selection procedure results in
systematic exclusion without first proving underrepresentation.
Evaluating evidence of systematic exclusion when a defendant has
not first established underrepresentation is a meaningless exercise in
futility since the defendant will have ultimately failed to establish the
prima facie case necessary to carry a fair-cross-section claim.
Given the sequential nature inherent in Duren’s prongs, the
Court’s willingness to move to Duren’s third prong based solely on a
temporary assumption that the defendant has established
underrepresentation makes for curious analytical precedent. The
Court’s eagerness to emphasize that systematic exclusion is not “a
host of factors that, individually or in combination, might contribute
to a group’s underrepresentation”95 is the most likely explanation for
this analytical reordering. However, a more strategic motivation may
be behind the Court’s Smith decision.
Allowing courts to proceed to Duren’s third prong without
conclusively establishing underrepresentation would cause more faircross-section claims to fail on systematic exclusion without ever
93. Smith, 130 S. Ct. at 1394.
94. Id. at 1395.
95. Id.
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requiring the conclusive exposure of problematic disparities in jury
venires. Such an analytical reordering would allow a court to avoid
confirming that a state’s jury venires were afflicted with
underrepresentation before denying a fair-cross-section claim if a
defendant cannot establish systematic exclusion.
This would not be the first time the Court has proceeded through
analytical prongs out of sequence in order to prevent probing
unnecessarily at institutional sensitivities. For example, for a
criminal defendant to show ineffective assistance of counsel, he must
show that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s
result would have been different.96 Though Justice O’Connor
reviewed performance before prejudice in her Strickland opinion,97
she stated that courts need not remain faithful to her analytical
ordering if reviewing prejudice first would dispose of the case—and
the need to review too closely defense counsel’s performance and, by
implication, the criminal justice system’s equity.98 This flexible
ordering allows courts to avoid both a determination as to counsel’s
skill99 and an examination of systemic inadequacies in the criminal
justice system100 unless absolutely necessary.
In the context of fair-cross-section claims, the Court’s
reordering in Smith would be preferable for both the judiciary and
the state. By leaving the issue of underrepresentation undecided,
neither institution would need to confront the uncomfortable reality
that judicially recognized disparity has been left unremedied.
Of course, since Smith reached the Court on a habeas petition,
the Court has ultimately only decided whether the Michigan
Supreme Court’s application of the Duren test to the facts presented
in Smith was reasonable.101 Accordingly, the Court’s analysis here
can just as easily be understood as explaining the reasonableness of
the Michigan Supreme Court’s Duren analysis, rather than as a
substantive departure from the fair-cross-section analytical order.
Regardless, contributing any additional ambiguity to fair-cross96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
(2007).
101.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
Id. at 698–700.
See id. at 697.
Id.
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 417 n.188
As is the standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
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section jurisprudence is irresponsible—especially in a decision that
abjectly failed to impart clarity in measuring underrepresentation.102
V. CONCLUSION
On its face, Smith is a relatively simple rejection of a habeas
corpus petition asserting a fair-cross-section claim. In terms of the
opinion’s clearest holdings, the Court instructed that it has no
preference for any particular method of establishing
underrepresentation103 and that a defendant cannot show systematic
exclusion “merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually
or in combination, might contribute to a group’s
underrepresentation.”104 However, in addition to issuing these
unelaborated holdings, the Court has committed serious missteps.
First, the Court’s failure to meaningfully confront the muddled
jurisprudence
surrounding
the
appropriate
measure
of
underrepresentation necessary to satisfy Duren’s second prong is
disappointing. The Court’s silence here is particularly frustrating for
small populations of distinctive groups because they are left
vulnerable to total exclusion from jury venires should courts
irresponsibly exercise the statistical discretion the Smith Court has
left to them. Second, the Court’s willingness to evaluate Smith’s
evidence of systematic exclusion even after finding that he had failed
to show underrepresentation represents a curious and potentially
irresponsible departure from fair-cross-section jurisprudence.
Although the Court’s flexibility in applying Duren’s prongs may not
endure, it is an unfortunate injection of additional ambiguity to an
area already muddled by competing statistical measures. Together,
these failures have combined to make adjudicating and protecting a
defendant’s right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section
of the community unnecessarily vague and vulnerable to abuse.

102. See supra Part IV.A.
103. Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1393–94 (2010).
104. Id. at 1395.

